Official forecasts predict Britain’s population will rise 15% by 2050, an extra 9m people. For Sweden, the forecasts say the population will grow by about a fifth. Some of this is the result of immigration and rising longevity but, according to David Coleman, a demographer at Oxford University, the recovery is also the result of older women having more children “almost sufficient to compensate for the sharply reduced birth rates of younger women”. This is exactly what was hoped for, but does not seem to be happening yet, in the Mediterranean and eastern Europe.

If you take account of late childbearing, you find that 16 European countries, with a total population of 234m, now have fertility rates of 1.8 or more. Half are above 2.0. Despite near-panic about “inevitably” declining population, then, some European countries are growing quite strongly. They are rare examples of bucking the trend that, as countries get richer, their birth rates fall.

Why? There are no obvious answers. The French run policies to increase the birth rate; the British do not. Most high-fertility countries are high-tax, high-welfare ones (France, the Netherlands, Scandinavia). But so is Germany, and its fertility has been declining for decades; whereas Ireland is not, and its population is growing. Maybe Ireland and France are responding to Catholic teaching on big families? Hardly. Remember Italy and Poland.

Though it is hard to be sure, the most plausible explanation is that some countries have struck a successful balance between life and work that enables parents to raise children without sacrificing their careers, and that this encourages child-rearing. If the explanation is right, it does not matter that France doles out presidential medals. But it does matter that it has an excellent, state-subsidised system of creches, to which mothers are happy to entrust their offspring.

Nor is it just a matter of guaranteeing minimum parental leave—or Germany, with generous provisions, would have lots of babies. Rather, the evidence suggests a whole host of measures, often designed to achieve other social goals, can boost the birth rate almost as a side-effect. These measures include a flexible education system (so parents can go back to school after having children); flexible working hours and, if Scandinavia is anything to go by, a strong emphasis on sexual equality.

This involves a shift of values as much as a change of policies. Northern countries have removed the stigma from illegitimacy (France stopped using the term in official documents in 2005; 55% of births in Sweden are outside wedlock). By and large, Mediterranean countries have not, and nor have Muslims in Europe. High-fertility countries do not merely tolerate mothers with paid employment; they encourage them to return to work and insist employers keep jobs open.

Go forth and multiply (a bit)

None of this means that Europe has broken the chains of its demography. The EU’s overall population will fall by 7m by 2050. The so-called support ratio (roughly, the proportion of workers to pensioners) is declining everywhere. And as Mr Coleman points out, Europe’s share of global population will fall from 21% now to 7% by 2050. Even its successes are only relative. A fertility rate of 1.8 is still below replacement.

All the same, small shifts in fertility or the retirement age can go a long way to alleviating the burdens of population decline. Raising the retirement age by a year or two can make the difference between the solvency and insolvency of pensions. On current rates, Italy will have a mere 1.4 workers to support each retired person by 2050. France and Britain will have a much more favourable age pyramid, with more than two workers per pensioner.

All this is a world away from the other rich country with demographic growth: America. Much American debate focuses on the role of marriage and the traditional family in fostering a healthy society. In Europe, by contrast, only countries with many births outside wedlock and with high female participation rates have reasonably high birth rates. Those that have sought to maintain traditional family ties have seen fertility collapse.

Europeans are only starting the process of recovery. Compared with America, even the growing parts of the continent have modest fertility rates and high dependency ratios. But if Europe has a demographic future it lies in Britain, France and Scandinavia, not across the Atlantic.
http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9334869